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I would like to take this opportunity to address 
the most important aspects of this discussion by way of 
these concluding remarks. First, I will address 
directly the comments made by Mr. Thomas Eudaly regard-
ing the contents of my paper. Second, I will address 
Searle*s use of the "syntax/semantics" distinction as a 
way of presenting part of his position, since his use 
of this realtionship generated much controversy in our 
discussion. Finally, I will address Searle's distinc-
tion between "intrinsic intentionality" and "observer-
relative intentionality" since this generated more con-
troversy than any other point made in my paper. 
As to Mr. Eudaly's comments, I think we must accept 
his point concerning the validity of the "causal 
argument" as presented in my paper. Clearly, one can-
not deduce necessary conditions from sufficient condi-
tions. I am, however, prepared to accept as the new 
conclusion to the "causal argument" the following: 
So, 5. B will have the same intentional states as a 
human brain if its component parts interact 
electrically in a way analogous to the way 
the parts of the human brain do; 
since I think that such a modified conclusion is not as 
damaging to the "causal argument" as Mr. Eudaly's com-
ments would seem to suggest. 
Mr. Eudaly claims that Searle's positive and nega-
tive theses are entirely separate. With this claim I 
must disagree, not only because it is crucial to the 
claims of my paper, but because it exposes a misunder-
standing of the current debate in cognitive science. 
Before addressing this specific claim, I would like to 
take another look at cognitive science. Both Searle 
and the proponents of strong AI accept certain claims 
as true and then contest what can be derived or deduced 
from these basic claims. In his comments, Mr. Eudaly 
has chosen to question these basic claims, something 
that should perhaps be done, but something I have 
chosen not to do in order to bring to the forefront the 
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nature of the debate between Searle and strong AI. For 
example, the following is a simplified version of 
Searle's argument against strong AI. 
1. If X is a digital computer, then X can only run 
programs. 
2. If X can only run digital programs, then X can-
not produce intentional states (since nothing 
can produce intentional states merely in virtue 
of its running a program). 
3 . X is a digital computer (as described by strong 
AI). 
So, 4. X cannot produce intentional states. 
In his comments Mr. Eudaly states "|f]rom the fact 
that digital computers don't think in virtue of running 
programs, we cannot infer that digital computers don't 
think, let alone infer that only things with the causal 
powers of the brain can think." (p. 213) It should be 
clear that in making his claim, Mr. Eudaly is calling 
into question the first premise of the above argument, 
a premise that both Searle and his opponents take for 
granted. Thus, Mr. Eudaly'a comments, although they 
may have a point, go far beyond the scope of both 
Searle's work and mine, and question the legitimacy of 
cognitive science itself. Furthermore, although it is 
indeed logically possible that a computer could begin 
to produce intentional states independent of its abil-
ity to run programs, both Searle and his opponents are 
concerned only with what digital computers can, in 
fact, do. In this case, Mr. Eudaly has ventured into 
the realm of computer theory and questioned the claims 
made by experts in this field with respect to what com-
puters can and cannot do. In these various cases, 
Searle and his opponents are concerned only with what 
is actually achievable now, according to computer 
theory, not with what is logically possible. Thus, I 
think that Mr. Eudaly's comments have not addressed the 
debate at hand but, rather, have called into question 
whether such a debate is possible. 
As to Mr. Eudaly*s specific claim that Searle's 
positive and negative theses are entirely separate, I 
have said I must disagree. Insofar as there is any 
agreement as to the available theses, Searle is merely 
proposing that we accept the only other "alternative" 
thesis, having disposed of strong AI. That is, there 
are only two available theses, and if one is refuted, 
the other must be defended. If we borrow terminology 
from Ned Block ("Mental Images and Cognitive Science") 
we can say that there are two positions to be held, 
descriptionalism and pictorialism. The former view 
claims that all mental images and other mental 
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processes represent sententially and this allows us to 
create programs that re-create these states, since com-
puter programs also represent sententially. The latter 
view claims that mental images represent pictorially, 
where 'pictorially' is used in a technical sense to 
mean that certain brain states represent because cer-
tain relations in that brain state are analogous to 
relations that obtain in what is being represented. I 
think Searle's "causal powers of the brain" position is 
quite similar to the view Block labels "pictorialism." 
In any case, the point here is that Searle is analyzing 
and criticizing the current claims of cognitive 
science. To do so he must operate within the basic 
strictures of that science. For Mr. Eudaly to propose 
that Searle's two positions are totally unrelated is to 
again call into question the notion of cognitive 
science itself. This is not what Searle, nor I, want 
to do. And since Mr. Eudaly seems to accept Searle's 
negative thesis, he has thereby accepted some of the 
basic tenets of cognitive science and I do not, there-
fore, find his comments the source of great concern, 
since they do not seem to address the debate at hand. 
During this discussion it has been suggested that 
Searle's use of the "syntax without semantics" distinc-
tion is both confused and confusing. I think that this 
complaint is unwarranted insofar as it is being given 
too much import. Searle's use of this phrase is in-
tended to do no more than draw our attention to the 
fact that, borrowing Kant's terms, a computer will al-
ways have "form" but will never have "matter" or 
content. To claim that Searle is trying to do anything 
more with this phrase is to find more in it than is ac-
tually being claimed. The point is simply this, no 
matter how much more information we give the computer 
in the form of programs (syntax), the amount it will 
know remains the same, namely, zero, because we cannot 
give it any referents (semantics) to which it can be 
said to apply its information. 
Finally, there has been much heated debate about 
the legitimacy of Searle's distinction between "intrin-
sic" and "observer-relative" intentionality. The de-
bate has centered on this thesis and its epistemologi-
cal implications. That is, according to Searle, how 
will we ever know that something other than each indiv-
idual (which knows whether it has intrinsic inteintion-
ality) has this "intrinsic" intentionality? Many have 
found Searle's answer unsatisfactory. Searle's answer 
is, of course, that we must disassemble the entity in 
question, or perform some other empirical investiga-
tion, in order to discern whether it has causal powers 
like those of the human brain. In other words, if I 
were to observe one of you, the audience, in actions 
and behaviors indistinguishable from other human beings 
(thereby passing the Turing test) and I were to then 
discover, upon opening you up, that you were filled 
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with sand and operated by extra-terrestrials, I would 
question whether you possessed intentional states. If 
we do not accept Searle's empirically oriented thesis, 
then we are left with nothing but the Turing test, a 
test that could accept a sophisticated sand bag as hav-
ing intentionality. 
I think that the objections raised to Searle's the-
sis of "intrinsic" intentionality are all based on a 
notion of knowledge that is quite strong, stronger than 
I think we can accept. Without offering a treatise on 
epistemology, I would like to suggest that even in our 
everyday life, we make inferences based on experience 
and behaviour that we accept as correct, but we could 
always be mistaken. I have good reasons to believe 
that everyone in this room is capable of and does pos-
sess intentionality. In fact, I probably have some of 
the strongest reasons for accepting this, based on my 
past experiences and your behavior. However, I could 
be mistaken about one or all of you and with a test 
like the Turing test that depends only on your overt 
behavior, I could never hope to expose which one of you 
is the remote-controlled sand bag. Only if we accept 
an empirical thesis of the sort proposed by Searle, do 
we have a test that will not admit what should not be 
admitted to the class of "things with intentional 
states." 
In conclusion, I think that although Searle's posi-
tion stands in need of further clarification, it stands 
nonetheless. Mr. Eudaly's comments seem pointed at the 
larger question of "Is cognitive science in any form 
possible?" In this case, Mr. Eudaly is obliged to of-
fer us an alternative view to those offered in this 
discussion, as well as show us how he can accept cer-
tain basic claims of cognitive science while rejecting 
others. It seems that he has done neither. Certainly 
there are many questions yet to be answered about in-
tentionality, artificial intelligence, and the causal 
powers of the brain, but this discussion has been a 
first step in seeking such answers. 
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